We empirically investigate the GHG emissions embodied in the bilateral trade between the United States and China and the United States and India and their countryspecific and global environmental impacts. In order to address the concerns of "levelplaying-field" and carbon leakage associated with domestic carbon pricing scheme, various border carbon adjustments have been proposed in recent U.S. climate change legislation. Employing GTAP-E model, this study examines how and to what extent the proposed carbon tariffs and export subsidies potentially affect bilateral trade flow, domestic production, and the GHG emissions. Results indicate that carbon tariff effectively alleviates the impact of domestic carbon tax on vulnerable domestic industries and slightly raises their output and GHG emissions. In addition, it is also evident that a combined or full border adjustment policy has bigger impacts than an individual policy.
Introduction
The interaction between international trade and the environment has become an increasingly important topic within both the academic literature and policy analysis. This is a result of deeper economic integration and world climate change concerns (e.g., Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 2001; Copeland and Taylor 2005) . In the design of U.S.
climate policy there are extensive discussions on the potential economic impact of federal legislation and multilateral international agreements. By imposing a cost on domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, proposed U.S. climate policy will adversely affect domestic carbon-intensive industries competing in both international and domestic markets. If other countries adopt less strict climate policies, producers of comparable carbon-intensive goods in such countries obtain an unfair competitive advantage by not complying with proper environmental practices. This is known as the "level-playing-field" complaint (Houser et al. 2008 ).
Carbon leakage could occur when U.S. GHG emission reductions resulting from a strict domestic climate policy cause an increase in GHG emissions in developing countries. It happens through the substitution of carbon-intensive goods with imported goods or through production relocation to other countries (Asselt and Brewer 2010) .
Furthermore, as international climate frameworks such as the Kyoto Protocol set emission reduction targets based on the location of GHG emissions rather than on the location of final consumption, several studies suggest that significant environmental impacts can be shifted from more service-oriented economies to other economies (e.g., Li and Hewitt 2008; Ackerman, Ishikawa, and Suga 2007; Pan, Phillips, and Chen 2008) .
The United States, China, and India are among the world's largest emitters of GHGs. China overtook the United States to become the number one emitter in 2006, which can be largely attributed to its rapid economic growth, coal-dominated energy structure, and increasing exports (Lin and Sun 2010) . China produced 6,200 million tons of carbon dioxide, while the estimated U.S. emissions were roughly 5,800 million tons. Various border carbon adjustments (BCAs) have been proposed to address carbon leakage in recent U.S. climate change legislation. The related policy options include (i) carbon tariffs, which require importers to pay an equivalent amount of carbon tax as applied to domestic producers; (ii) carbon allowances, which require importers to purchase and surrender a certain amount of emission allowances to reflect the GHG emitted in the production process (Lockwood and Whalley 2009) ; and (iii) export subsidies, in which the government partially or entirely reduces the number of GHG allowances owed by a domestic entity, with the reduction amount ultimately being based on the entity's quantity of exports. While carbon tariff and allowance options are intended to level the carbon playing field for U.S. producers competing in domestic markets, export subsidies are provided for U.S. exporters to alleviate their emission cost burdens and enable them to maintain competitiveness in international markets.
Because the imposition of BCAs is conditioned on whether the trade partner has imposed comparable climate policy to that of the United States, both China and India are clearly the possible targets (Houser et al. 2008 ). This study attempts to investigate empirically how and to what extent the proposed carbon tariffs and export subsidies potentially affect bilateral trade flow, domestic production, and the GHG emissions.
Related Literature
A number of recent studies have examined the carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions embodied in China's exports and have estimated their contribution to China and world CO 2 emissions. For example, Shui and Harriss (2006) Our paper differs from the existing literature in several important ways. First, in contrast to the other studies, besides combustion-based CO 2 emissions, we account for non-CO 2 GHG emissions to quantify sector GHG intensity and emissions embodied in bilateral trade. While agriculture contributes over 20% of anthropogenic GHG emissions in terms of metric tons of CO 2 equivalent (IPCC 2001) , taking these non-CO 2 gases into account provides a complete picture of trade-related environmental impacts. Second, by focusing on the "presumptively eligible" industries in the U.S. and imposing a carbon tariff on trading partner imports only, we evaluate the policies' impacts in a simplified and clear way and provide a benchmark for further extension.
Greenhouse Gas Intensity and Emissions Embodied in U.S.-China and U.S.-India Trade
The GHG emissions embodied in bilateral trade between the U.S. and China and the U.S.
and India are calculated using the Global Trade Analysis Project's 7.0 data set (GTAP 7) for 2004 (Narayanan and Walmsley 2008) in combination with the combustion-based CO 2 and non-CO 2 GHG emissions data set (GTAP-E) (Lee 2008a (Lee , 2008b Rose and Lee 2008) . The non-CO 2 GHG, including nitrous oxide (N 2 O), methane (CH 4 ), and carbon from land clearing, are largely emitted by agricultural production and related activities.
The GTAP model is a static multiregion, multisector applied general equilibrium model that distinguishes 57 sectors and 113 countries and regions. The model is able to capture details of interactions between domestic sectors and international trading partners.
In the first step, GHG intensities for the covered sectors in each country are calculated by dividing each sector's GHG emission amount by its respective GDP, resulting in the GHG intensity in metric tons of CO 2 equivalent per thousand dollars (Mg 
Impacts of Border Carbon Adjustments
The economic and environmental impacts of trade policies imposed on the border, including carbon tariff and export subsidies, are simulated through comparisons between the baseline scenario and various policy scenarios using the GTAP-E model. In accordance with the provisions of the proposed climate legislation, particularly the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), we focus on the energyintensive trade-exposed (EITE) industries. Essentially, these industries are those that have a relatively large share of energy costs, are more likely to be significantly affected by carbon pricing policy, and are more vulnerable to international competition.
To be eligible for border adjustment policies as EITE industries, a sector must have (i) an energy or GHG intensity of at least 5% and a trade intensity of at least 15%, or (ii) an energy intensity or GHG intensity of at least 20%, regardless of its trade intensity.
2 First, a baseline scenario is set up to simulate the effects of climate policy alone (without any BCAs). The climate policy is modeled as a domestic carbon tax with an exogenous and constant carbon price, which is imposed on GHG emissions resulting Following the methodology used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2009), five aggregated GTAP sectors are considered in this study: chemicals, rubber, and plastic products; pulp, paper, and print; nonmetallic minerals; iron and steel; and nonferrous metals. from fossil fuel consumption in all sectors and commodities through a built-in carbon price mechanism in GTAP-E. An emission price of $15 per ton of CO 2 -e is imposed, the level of which is representative of near-term prices proposed by various studies. Second, we consider a scenario in which the carbon tariff is applied to the imports of EITE industry products from China and India (Scenario 1). Because GTAP aggregates China and India as one region, we call it China/India in this section. The effects of BCAs are simulated on the combined basis of these two countries, and the GHG intensities are adjusted accordingly. The carbon tariff is calculated as the given carbon price multiplied by the respective GHG intensity in each covered sector. GHG intensity is defined based on the carbon content embodied in imports after accounting for GHG emissions in the production process in exporting countries.
Policy effects of export subsidies are simulated in Scenario 2. By rebating the value of GHG emissions embodied in exports of EITE industries, this policy intends to offset any competitive disadvantages induced by domestic climate policy. The subsidy is implemented by reducing the amount each covered sector paid for domestic carbon taxes, with the reduced amounts calculated using Brown and Gifford's Allowance Distribution Tool (Brown and Gifford 2010) . Finally, we combine the policies, carbon tariffs and export subsidies, to investigate their joint effects on competitiveness and carbon leakage in Scenarios 3 and 4. The difference between the last two scenarios is that Scenario 3 uses the GHG intensity of China and India to calculate the carbon tariff while Scenario 4 uses the GHG intensity of U.S. domestic production. Table 1 compares the effects of different policy scenarios on U.S. domestic production, export prices, and trade flows between the U.S. and China/India, and the GHG emissions. Compared with no carbon pricing in the case of "business as usual," in the baseline scenario with a $15 emission price, the trade balance of all U.S. industries is reduced by $1.9 billion, while that of China/India is increased by $76.4 million.
Meanwhile, China/India exports $37.1 million more products to the U.S., together with a roughly $304.7 million increase in its industry output. The production contraction associated with a carbon price is about $4.6 billion in the United States. In terms of environmental impact, GHG emissions decline by about 112 million metric tons in the United States, while China/India experiences a 0.6 million metric ton increase in GHG emissions induced by increased industrial production.
In Table 1 , the results of all policy scenarios (Scenarios 1-4) represent changes relative to the baseline scenario (i.e., the imposition of a domestic carbon tax) that accompany various BCA policies. Results in Table 1 confirm that the imposition of a carbon tariff on China/India's EITE products by the U.S. effectively alleviates the impact of carbon pricing on vulnerable domestic industries and slightly raises domestic output of EITE industries. As a result, relative to the baseline, U.S. aggregate imports of the EITE industries from China/India declines by $256.3 million. On the other hand, the export subsidies lead to an increase of $297.9 million in the output of domestic EITE industries.
It is also evident that a combined or full border adjustment policy has bigger impacts than an individual policy. For example, the U.S. trade balance increases by $332.4 million in Scenario 3 compared with increases of $209.3 million in Scenario 1 and $123.2 million in Scenario 2. U.S. industry output increases by $557 million, which is $259.1 million higher than under an export subsidy alone and $297.9 million higher than the output under a carbon tariff. Furthermore, because of the significant difference in GHG intensities between the U.S. and China/India, the policy impacts are different when different GHG intensities are used to calculate the amount of the carbon tariff. In general, using China/India's GHG intensity leads to more substantial impacts than using that of the U.S. This point is supported by a comparison between Scenarios 3 and 4 in Table 1 .
In most of the categories, the impacts of a carbon tariff based on the U.S. GHG intensity (Scenario 4) are weaker than those based on China/India's GHG intensity (Scenario 3).
But in practice, we lack complete information on the GHG intensity of China/India's imports, and the use of domestic intensity when calculating the carbon tariff could be a reasonable alternative.
In terms of environmental impact, both the carbon tariff and the export subsidy encourage U.S. domestic output and depress industrial production in China/India relative to the baseline. Consequently, they raise U.S. GHG emissions by 0.1 -6.8 million tons CO 2 -e and reduce China/India's emissions by 0.4 -0.7 million tons CO 2 -e. The carbon leakage concern is largely addressed by these border trade policies. The results also indicate that the U.S. BCA policies may increase global GHG emissions, although the conclusion is constrained by the limited regions we considered in this study.
Results show that the effects of BCAs are generally small, which partly results from the fact that China and India are not large sources of imports in the carbon-intensive sectors considered in this study. But both policy options largely help to mitigate adverse impacts induced by U.S. domestic carbon pricing policy.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine carbon embodied in bilateral U.S.-China and U.S.-India trade, and the carbon leakage problem under a U.S. carbon policy. With carbon pricing policy in place in the U.S., this cost disadvantage will encourage carbon-intensive production to be shifted to China or India, undermining efforts to cut GHG emissions and contain climate change. Various border carbon adjustment policies, which have been proposed as a solution to this problem, are then examined. This study contributes to the literature on interactions between international trade and the environment. Moreover, our exploration of potential impacts of proposed border adjustments is highly relevant to climate change policy considerations in all countries. One avenue for future research would be to endogenize the emissions price and technological progress, which remained fixed in this study. Keeping track of changes in countries' GHG intensities is another possible direction. 
